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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1988 Supp.) and Rule 
4A of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case involves a tragic automobile accident which 
occurred on 27 August 1986 in East Canyon. Rodney Grow, the 
driver of the vehicle, age 17, and his two passengers, Michael 
Quintana and Christopher McCaffery, ages 16 and 18 respectively, 
were all fatally injured when the vehicle in which they were 
traveling left the road and collided with a tree. The vehicle 
impacted the tree at an estimated 90 m.p.h. 
The automobile was owned by Michael Morris and uninsured at 
the time. 
Christopher McCaffery!s father brought suit against Terry 
Grow, the personal representative of Rodney Grow, Pat Grow, 
Rodney's mother, since she had signed his driver's license 
application, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
the Grow's automobile insurer. 
State Farm moved for summary judgment on the ground that Pat 
Grow and Rodney Grow were not entitled to liability coverage as 
Rodney Grow was driving Michael Morris1 vehicle without his 
permission and on the additional ground that Christopher 
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McCaffery was not entitled to PIP benefits because he was not 
occupying Rodney GrowTs vehicle at the time of the accident but 
rather was occupying Michael Morris' vehicle. Before arguments 
could be heard on the motion, State Farm settled the liability 
claim with the McCafferys but refused to settle the PIP claim. 
The court subsequently granted State Farm's motion with respect 
to PIP coverage and this appeal followed. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Is Christopher McCaffery entitled to PIP benefits from 
Rodney Grow's policy even though Christopher was not riding in 
Rodneyfs vehicle at the time of the accident? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-308, reproduced in the text. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although the facts are undisputed in this case, see page 2 
of plaintifffs memorandum of points and authorities in opposition 
to State Farm's motion for summary judgment (R-099), State Farm 
wishes to add the following facts for purposes of clarity and 
completeness: 
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1. On 27 August 1986, a group of teenagers from 
Taylorsville High were attending a drinking party, depositions of 
Michael Jendrycka, pages 19-21; Jeremy Hardman, page 11; and 
Shawn Martinez, page 19, near Affleck Park, approximately four 
miles up East Canyon. It was their "last summer fling." 
Deposition of Lyle Robinson, page 11. The youth were consuming 
"[q]uite a bit" of Wyoming beer, and a beer bong was being used 
by Christopher ("Chris") McCaffery for purposes of consuming 
large quantities of beer in a matter of seconds. Depositions of 
Michael Jendrycka, pages 20-23; and Shawn Martinez, pages 64-65. 
2. Rodney Grow got into a fight with his girlfriend and 
became upset and started to drive his red 1976 Mustang II up and 
down the canyon road. Depositions of Michael Morris, pages 46-
48; Shawn Martinez, page 34; and Michael Jendrycka, pages 23-25. 
Rodney was "driving like an idiot . . . a hellion[,]" deposition 
of Michael Jendrycka, page 25, "lock[ing] up the brakes[,]" id. , 
"spinning around and doing doughnuts in the dirt[,]" deposition 
of Michael Morris, page 47. 
3. Michael Jendrycka observed Rodney driving his Mustang II 
up and down the canyon road and got into the car with him. 
Deposition of Michael Jendrycka, page 24. They drove up and down 
the canyon road a few more times then parked the red Mustang II 
near Michael Morris1 1967 dark blue and primer gray Mustang. Id. 
at 26 & 28. 
4. Meanwhile, Michael Morris and a few of his friends had 
gone to Parley's Summit for a bite to eat. ^ - a t 2 8 anc* 
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deposition of Michael Morris, pages 18-19. He rode with a friend 
and left his vehicle parked by the roadside- It was unlocked but 
he took his keys with him in his pocket. Deposition of Michael 
Morris, pages 19-21. 
5. After parking the red Mustang II, Rodney and Michael 
Jendrycka got out, grabbed a couple of beers, then went back to 
where the cars were parked to talk. Deposition of Michael 
Jendrycka, page 26. 
6. Michael Jendrycka sat on the trunk of Michael Morris1 
1967 dark blue and primer gray Mustang, and Rodney Grow opened 
the unlocked door and sat sideways on the driver's seat with his 
feet hanging out of the car. Id. at 26 & 28. 
7. They talked about girls and cars, then "out of the blue" 
Rodney tried the key to his 1976 red Mustang II in the ignition 
of Morris1 vehicle, and it fit. Id. 
8. Rodney then said, "Let's go for a ride," and Michael 
Jendrycka responded, "All right. Let me drive." Ld. at 27. 
9. (Michael Jendrycka was a friend of Michael Morris, but 
Rodney was only an acquaintance. Deposition of Michael Morris, 
pages 14 & 21-22.) 
10. Rodney wanted to go "for a spin in a fast car." 
Deposition of Michael Jendrycka, page 50, (The Morris vehicle 
could travel as fast as 130 m.p.h.) 
11. Rodney and Michael Jendrycka then took turns driving 
Michael Morris1 car up and down the canyon road. .Id. at 27 & 30-
31. They did not have his permission to do so. Depositions of 
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Shawn Martinez, pages 70-71; Jeremy Hardman, page 41; Trooper 
John Graber, pages 55, 76-77, 89-91; Michael Jendrycka, pages 11-
12, 29-30, 55-56; and Michael Morris, pages 14, 20, 29-30, 54-55, 
67, 71, 80-81, 82. 
12. A short time later they parked the car because it was 
beginning to overheat. Deposition of Michael Jendrycka, page 31. 
13. Sometime thereafter Rodney got back into the car, along 
with Michael Quintana and Christopher McCaffery. Ij3. at 34-38. 
There were initially four passengers in the car, but two of the 
teenagers had gotten out when they discovered that Rodney Grow, 
who had been drinking, would be driving. Depositions of Shawn 
Martinez, page 62; Jeremy Hardman, page 27; and Lyle Robinson, 
page 28. 
14. Rodney and his passengers then drove a few miles up the 
canyon, turned around, and proceeded back down. As they neared 
the campsite where the party was located, they were traveling at 
a very high rate of speed (104 - 111 m.p.h.), lost control of the 
vehicle, and collided into a tree. The accident was fatal for 
all three occupants in the car. See generally deposition of 
Trooper John Graber, exhibit A. 
15. The Morris vehicle was uninsured at the time of the 
accident. Deposition of Michael Morris, page 11. 
16. Rodney Grow and his mother, who had signed his driver1s 
license application, were insureds of State Farm at the time of 
the accident. Their policies contained both liability coverage 
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and personal injury protection coverage. See copy of policy 
attached to appellant!s brief (R-071). 
17. State Farm sought to deny liability coverage on the 
ground that Rodney was operating a non-owned car without the 
permission of its owner. See State Farm's memorandum in support 
of summary judgment (R-047). 
18. State Farm later settled the liability claim by paying 
$25,000, policy limits, to the personal representative of Chris 
McCaffery (R-211). 
19. State Farm continues to deny PIP benefits on the ground 
that Chris McCaffery was not occupying Rodney Grow's vehicle at 
the time of the accident but was rather occupying Michael Morris1 
vehicle. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The non-owned car exclusion has nothing to do with whether 
or not Chris McCaffery is entitled to PIP benefits. The non-
owned car exclusion is found in the liability section of Rodney 
Grow's policy and was relied upon by State Farm in denying 
liability coverage to the Grows, but that part of the case has 
settled and the non-owned car exclusion is no longer at issue. 
The issue on appeal is whether or not Chris McCaffery is entitled 
to PIP benefits even though he was occupying Michael Morris* 
vehicle at the time of the accident and not Rodney Grow's 
vehicle. This issue should be resolved in favor of State Farm 
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since the Insurance Code and case law clearly state that PIP 
benefits can only be afforded to Chris McCaffery if he was an 
occupant in Rodney Grow!s vehicle at the time of the accident. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CHRIS McCAFFERY IS ENTITLED TO PIP BENEFITS 
FROM HIS OWN INSURER, ASSUMING HE WAS 
INSURED, BUT NOT FROM STATE FARM. PLAINTIFF 
HAS CONFUSED LIABILITY COVERAGE WITH PIP 
COVERAGE. 
Plaintiff is confused. State Farm relied on the non-owned 
car exclusion to deny liability coverage to the Grows. It did 
not rely on the non-owned car exclusion to deny PIP benefits to 
Chris McCaffery. The non-owned car exclusion appears in the 
liability section of the policy. See page 5 of the policy and 
the definition of a "Non-Owned Car" on page 2 of the policy. The 
non-owned car exclusion does not even appear in Section II of the 
policy dealing with PIP benefits. 
State Farm denied PIP benefits on the ground that Chris 
McCaffery was not occupying Rodney Grow's vehicle at the time of 
the accident but was rather occupying Michael Morris1 vehicle. 
See letter attached hereto in the addendum. An insured for 
purposes of personal injury protection coverage is defined as 
follows on page 8 of the policy: 
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Insured — means: 
1. you, your spouse or any relative: 
a. while occupying a motor vehicle; or 
b. when a pedestrian, if the bodily 
injury results from physical 
contact with a motor vehicle or 
motorcycle; or 
c. when occupying a motorcycle, if the 
bodily injury results from physical 
contact with a motor vehicle; and 
2. any other person: 
a. while occupying your car or a 
newly acquired car with the 
permission of: 
(1) you, your spouse, any relative; 
or 
(2) the person driving such car 
with your permission; or 
b. when struck as a pedestrian by your 
car or a newly acquired car. 
The second provision applies to Chris McCaffery since he was not 
a relative of Rodney Grow. Provision 2. states that Chris 
McCaffery is only entitled to PIP benefits if he was occupying 
"your car." "Your Car" is defined on page 3 of the policy as 
follows: 
Your Car — means the car or the vehicle 
described on the declarations page. 
The vehicle described on the declarations page of the policy 
is Rodney Growfs 1976 two-door Mustang. (The declarations page 
appears at the very front of the policy.) Since Chris McCaffery 
was not occupying Rodney Grow's vehicle at the time of the 
accident, State Farm denied PIP benefits. The non-owned car 
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exclusion had nothing to do with denying PIP benefits to Chris 
McCaffery. The non-owned car exclusion was however relied upon 
in denying liability coverage to the Grows. But that part of the 
case has been settled and is no longer at issue. The issue 
involved herein is whether the definition of "insured" for 
purposes of personal injury protection coverage violates the 
motor vehicle provisions of the new Insurance Code. It does 
not. The language of Rodney Grow's policy patterns that of the 
Insurance Code. 
Section 31A-22-308 describes those persons who are entitled 
to PIP benefits: 
31A-22-308. Persons covered by personal injury 
protection. 
The following may receive benefits under personal 
injury protection coverage: 
(1) the named insured and persons 
related to the insured by blood, marriage, 
adoption, or guardianship who are residents 
of the insured's household, including those 
who usually make their home in the same 
household but temporarily live elsewhere, 
when injured in an accident in Utah involving 
any motor vehicle; and 
(2 ) any other natural person whose 
injuries arise out of an automobile accident 
occurring in Utah while the person occupies a 
motor vehicle described in the policy with 
the express or implied consent of the named 
insured or while a pedestrian if he is 
injured in an accident involving the 
described motor vehicle. 
(Emphasis added.) Section (2) of the statute applies, again 
because Chris McCaffery was not a relative of Rodney Grow. Like 
the policy, section (2) states that Chris McCaffery is only 
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entitled to PIP benefits when occupying the "motor vehicle 
described in the policy." As previously indicated, the motor 
vehicle described in Rodney Grow's policy is a 1976 two-door 
Mustang. Since Chris McCaffery was not occupying Rodney Grow's 
vehicle at the time of the accident but was rather occupying 
Michael Morris* uninsured vehicle, Chris McCaffery is not 
entitled to PIP benefits. However, Chris McCaffery is entitled 
to PIP benefits under his own policy of insurance, assuming he 
was insured, or the policy of his parents, since in that case 
section (1) of the statute would apply, i.e., Chris McCaffery 
would be the named insured or a relative of the named insured, 
and section (1) applies to "any motor vehicle," not just to those 
vehicles described on the declarations page of the policy. 
Therefore, assuming Chris McCaffery or his parents had 
purchased a policy of insurance, there are no gaps in the no-
fault coverage; Chris1 injuries and death will be compensated. 
However, if the McCafferys were uninsured, they have no one to 
blame but themselves. 
Two cases are on point; one is from Utah and the other is 
from Florida. In Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 
1980) plaintiff Oscar Osuala, an uninsured motorist, collided 
with the rear of a truck driven by Clark Olson and owned by 
Olson Construction Co. Plaintiff brought suit against Aetna Life 
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& Casualty, the construction company's insurer, seeking PIP 
benefits. 
The court was called upon to construe § 31-41-7, the 
predecessor of § 31A-22-308. The statutes are substantially 
similar. Section 31-41-7 reads as follows: 
(1) The coverages described in section 31-41-6 
shall be applicable to: 
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the insured in an 
accident in this state involving any motor vehicle. 
(b) Personal injuries arising out of automobile 
accidents occurring in this state sustained by any 
other natural person while occupying the described 
motor vehicle with the consent of the insured or while 
a pedestrian if injured in an accident involving the 
described motor vehicle. 
The court held that since plaintiff was not occupying the 
described motor vehicle (i.e., the truck) at the time of the 
accident, he was not entitled to PIP benefits. The court then 
added: 
In regard to the plaintiff !s urgence that the no-
fault law is intended to provide coverage for others 
who might be injured as a result of an automobile 
accident, it is pertinent to observe that he himself 
has not met that requirement, because he was driving 
without insurance. An important aspect of the Act is 
the requirement that the PIP protections for an injured 
motorist are to be paid by his own insurer. To permit 
the plaintiff to violate the Act, and nevertheless 
insist upon compensation from the other motorist's 
insurer, regardless of fault, would reward him for his 
wrong, and would tend to defeat the purposes of the 
Act. 
Id. at 243-44. Summary judgment was affirmed in favor of Aetna. 
Protective National Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Padron, 310 So.2d 
432 (Fla. App. 1975) is squarely on point. Plaintiff, who was 
uninsured, was the passenger in an uninsured vehicle. The 
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driver of the vehicle, however, was insured. Plaintiff was 
injured in a collision and sought PIP benefits from the driver's 
policy. The driver's policy read as follows: 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
The Company will pay, in accordance with the Florida 
Automobile Reparations Reform Act, to or for the 
benefit of the injured person: 
(a) all reasonable medical expenses, and 
(b) . . . 
(c) . . . expenses, incurred as a result of bodily 
injury, caused by an accident arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle and 
sustained by: 
(1) the named insured or any relative while 
occupying a motor vehicle or, while a 
pedestrian, through being struck by a motor 
vehicle; or 
(2) any other person while occupying the 
insured motor vehicle or, while a pedestrian, 
through being struck by the insured motor 
vehicle. 
Id. at 433. The court stated as follows: 
The passenger contends that the phrase "arising 
out of . . . use of a motor vehicle" should be 
construed so as to grant her coverage. This 
construction is not supported by the terms of the 
policy or the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform (No 
Fault) Act. The phrase appears in paragraph (c) of the 
personal injury protection provision, but it cannot be 
extracted and construed on its own. Considering it in 
the context of the entire provision, paragraphs (a) 
through (c) including subparagraphs (1) and (2), supra 
leads us to the conclusion that coverage is not 
provided for this passenger. The meaning of the 
provision is that expenses will be paid for bodily 
injury caused by an accident arising out of use of a 
motor vehicle and sustained by any other person while 
occupying the insured motor vehicle. This factual 
situation does not obtain in the instant case. 
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The No Fault Act requires that the owner of a 
motor vehicle have insurance, not the driver. 
Therefore, the injured passenger, having no insurance 
of her own, must look to the owner of the motor vehicle 
for personal injury protection benefits irrespective of 
negligence. 
Id. at 433-34 (emphasis in original). Since the owner of the 
vehicle was also uninsured, plaintiff was unable to recover any 
insurance benefits. However, she had no one to blame but 
herself. Had she been insured, she could have collected PIP 
benefits from her own company. 
PIP coverage works as follows: Assuming Michael Morris was 
insured and Chris McCaffery was occupying his vehicle with his 
permission, section (2) of 31A-22-308 would apply and Morris1 
insurance would be primary pursuant to § 31A-22-309(4). However, 
since Morris was uninsured and Chris McCaffery was occupying his 
vehicle without his permission, Chris McCaffery must look to 
section (1) of 31A-22-308 and to his own policy of insurance for 
secondary coverage. Rodney Grow's policy is not even involved. 
Rodney Grow's policy does, however, extend PIP benefits to 
Rodney, but it in no way extends PIP benefits to Chris. If the 
McCafferys were uninsured, they have no one to blame but 
themselves. 
It is interesting to note that the other two occupants in 
the vehicle (Quintana and Grow) did obtain PIP benefits from 
their own insurers. 
Plaintiff next argues that State Farn^s policy is ambiguous; 
however, this argument is limited to the non-owned car exclusion 
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and, as already indicated, this exclusion was not relied upon by 
State Farm in denying PIP benefits. In fact, State Farm could 
not have relied upon this exclusion in denying PIP benefits since 
this exclusion appears in the liability section of the policy and 
not in the no-fault section of the policy. Plaintiff 
misperceives the issue. State Farm relied on the non-owned car 
exclusion in denying liability coverage to the Grows, but this 
exclusion has no bearing on whether or not Chris McCaffery is 
entitled to PIP benefits. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF HAS ALREADY SETTLED HIS LIABILITY 
CLAIM WITH STATE FARM. 
Plaintiff's argument that Pat Grow is jointly and severally 
liable for Chris McCafferyfs death has already been disposed of. 
Plaintiff settled his liability claim with Pat Grow. See 
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS and STIPULATION, MOTION AND ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE (R-211) attached hereto in the addendum. 
Moreover, Pat Grow's liability has nothing whatsoever to do with 
whether or not Chris McCaffery is entitled to PIP benefits. Pat 
Grow's liability is governed by the liability section of her 
policy, not by the no-fault section. As previously indicated, 
the issue of liability coverage has already been settled. The 
only remaining issue is PIP coverage. The case cited by 
plaintiff, United Services Automobile Association v. Crandall, 
deals with liability coverage, not PIP coverage, and is 
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therefore wholly inapplicable. Liability coverage and PIP 
coverage are two different issues. 
Moreover, § 41-2-115(2) does not even apply because Rodney 
Grow had purchased a policy of automobile insurance which fully 
complied with the Financial Responsibility Act. Section 41-2-
115(2) specifically states that it is qualified by § 41-2-115(3). 
The sections read as follows: 
(2) Any negligence or willful misconduct of a 
minor younger than 18 years of age when operating a 
motor vehicle upon a highway is imputed to the person 
who has signed the application of the minor for a 
permit or license. This person is jointly and 
severally liable with the minor for any damages caused 
by the negligence or willful misconduct, except as 
provided under Subsection (3). This liability 
provision is an exception to any conflicting liability 
provisions in the code. 
(3) If a minor deposits, or there is deposited on 
his behalf, proof of financial responsibility in 
respect to the operation of a motor vehicle he owns, or 
with respect to the operation of any motor vehicle if 
he does not own one, in form and in amounts as required 
under Chapter 12a, Title 41, Financial Responsibility 
of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act, the division 
may accept the application of the minor when signed by 
a parent or guardian of the minor. While the proof is 
maintained, that person is not subject to the liability 
imposed under Subsection (2). 
(Emphasis added.) Since Rodney Grow had purchased a policy of 
insurance, his liability cannot be imputed to Pat Grow. This 
issue is thoroughly discussed in 45 A.L.R.4th 87 § 29. 
Moreover, in Phillips v. Tooele City Corporation, 500 P. 2d 669, 
674 (Utah 1972) the court specifically held that these "statutes 
were designed solely to protect innocent third parties from the 
negligence of a minor driver by providing financial 
responsibility." If financial responsibility is provided, the 
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negligence of the minor cannot be imputed to the parent. This 
issue, however, is really irrelevant inasmuch as Pat Grow's 
liability has already been disposed of. Moreover, her liability 
has nothing to do with whether or not Chris McCaffery is entitled 
to PIP benefits. The PIP section and the liability section are 
different sections in the policy. Pat Grow's liability has 
nothing to do with PIP coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the lower court 
granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm and denying 
plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this {/ / d aY of December, 1988. 
HANSEN k CRIST 
trwirt C. Hansen 
C. Hansen 
Attorneys for State Farm 




Kfoverober 10, 1<W? 
Mr. Mike 'teOaffery 
5545 Edgewood HTive 
Rennion, TIT *4113 
RE: Our Insured: Rodney Grow 
Our Claim *: 44-0603-852 
Date of Loss: 08-27-86 
Dear Mr. McCaffery: 
This is to advise you that State Farm Insurance Cbrapanies cannot extend 
any Personal Injury Protection Coverage on behalf of Christopher McCaffery 
for the accident which occurred on August 27, 1986. 
Our State Farm Automobile Insurance Policy indicates that an insured, 
under definitions, means the insured, his spouse, or any relative while 
occupying a motor vehicle or any other person while occupying the insured's 
car or a newly-acquired car with the permission of the insured, his 
spouse, or any relative. 
Mr. Rodney Grow was driving a vehicle registered to Mr. Michael A. 
Morris, as far as we know at this particular point in time. 
If you have any questions in reference to this matter, please do not 





RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
For and in consideration of the payment to the undersigned 
of the total sum of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00), the 
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, MICHAEL H. 
McCAFFERY, as personal representative for and on behalf of 
CHRISTOPHER M. McCAFFERY, deceased, and for and on behalf of all the 
heirs of CHRISTOPHER M. McCAFFERY, deceased, hereby forever releases 
and discharges TERRY RAYMOND GROW as personal representative of 
RODNEY V. GROW, deceased, the Estate of RODNEY V. GROW, PAT GROW, 
individually, and STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and 
any and all other persons, firms, or corporations, from and of any 
and all claims, demands, benefits, either past or future, causes of 
action, damages, costs, loss of society and companionship, expenses, 
compensation, and damages of any kind (except those claims against 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY which are 
specifically reserved as set forth hereinafter), all on account of 
or in any way growing out of an automobile accident which occurred 
on or about August 27, 1986, as a result of which CHRISTOPHER M. 
McCAFFERY died. 
The undersigned hereby declares and represents that the 
damages sustained by the undersigned are permanent and ongoing, and 
in making this release and agreement, it is understood and agreed 
that the undersigned relies wholly upon his own judgment, belief and 
knowledge of the nature, extent and duration of said damages and in 
granting this complete release, the undersigned does not rely upon 
anything told to him or represented to him by the persons, firms or 
corporations who are being released, or by any person or persons 
representing them. 
Particularly, the undersigned releases the persons and 
companies referred to above from and of all causes of action, 
claims, demands, costs, expenses or compensation as set forth in 
that certain Amended Complaint on file in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein MICHAEL 
H. McCAFFERY, as personal representative for and and on behalf of 
CHRISTOPHER M. McCAFFERY, deceased, is plaintiff, and TERRY RAYMOND 
GROW, as personal representative of RODNEY V. GROW, deceased, PAT 
GROW, individually, and STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY are defendants, Civil No. C87-1789, except for those claims 
expressly reserved against defendant STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY as more particularly set forth hereunder and in 
the Stipulation, Motion and Order for Dismissal in the above-
specified civil action. 
Particularly, the undersigned releases the persons and 
companies referred to above from and of all causes of action, 
claims, demands, costs, expenses or compensations which may or could 
be raised now or at any time in the future as a result of the 
incident referred to above, except for those claims against STATE 
FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY specifically reserved 
hereinafter. 
The undersigned understands and agrees that this settlement 
is a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and that payment is 
not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of any 
of the persons or companies referred to above and who are released 
herein and by whom liability is expressly demied. 
The undersigned authorizes and consents to stipulate to a 
dismissal with prejudice on the merits of that certain action 
pending in the Third Judicial District Court, which is referred to 
above, except for those claims against STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY which are specifically reserved hereinunder and 
which are also specifically reserved in the Stipulation, Motion 
and Order for Dismissal. 
The undersigned further acknowledges and accepts the advice 
of counsel in the settlement of this matter and that this is a full, 
complete and final release (except for those claims specifically 
reserved against defendant STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY) of the above-named parties for any matter or thing done or 
omitted to be done by the said parties and as a result of the 
incident referred to above. The undersigned further represents that 
there are no unresolved subrogation claims and agrees that if any 
such claims should be made, he will indemnify and save harmless 
those parties released hereby. 
The undersigned further represents and warrants that by 
this Release of All Claims, he is settling all claims for the death 
of CHRISTOPHER M. McCAFFERY held by all heirs of the said 
CHRISTOPHER M. McCAFFERY, except for those claims specifically 
reserved against defendant STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
The undersigned specifically reserves his claims for no-
fault insurance benefits, including claims for costs and attorney's 
fees arising therefrom, if any, against STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, and the undersigned further acknowledges that all 
defenses available to STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY 
with respect to such claims of the undersigned are also reserved and 
remain pending in litigation. Except as specifically reserved 
herein, the undersigned releases STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY from all other claims for damages of any kind 
related to and/or arising from the automobile accident of August 27, 
19 86 and the death of CHRISTOPHER M. McCAFFERY. 
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing 
Release of All Claims, know the contents thereof and that I sign 
the same as my own free act, and it is my intention to be legally 
bound thereby. 
DATED this \<H day of ^n^ouisiL - , 1988. 
MICHAEL H. McCAFFERY^Hnttlvidually, 
as personal representative for and 
on behalf of CHRISTOPHER M. 
McCAFFERY, deceased, and as 
representative of all heirs of 
CHRISTOPHER M. McCAFFERY, deceased. 
ss, 
,1. M day o ^ W ^ , 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake) 
Personally appeared before me thj 
1988, MICHAEL H. McCAFFERY, the signer of the foregoing Release 
of All Claims, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
R e s i d i ng Sit/C ; < ^ ^ ^ 
My Commission Expires: 
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MAR 2 1 1988 
J*-Qixon HincStxyr-Clerk 3, a DIM Court 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL H. McCAFFERY, as 
personal representative for 
and on behalf of CHRISTOPHER 
M. McCAFFERY, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERRY RAYMOND GROW, as 
personal representative of 
RODNEY V. GROW, deceased, 
PAT GROW, individually, and 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, by and through counsel of record, James R. Brown 
and Harold L. Reiser of the law firm of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown 
& Dunn; defendants Terry Raymond Grow, as personal representative 
of Rodney V. Grow, deceased, and Pat Grow, by and through counsel, 
Stuart H. Schultz of the law firm of Strong & Hanni, and Nolan 
J. Olsen, of the law firm of Olsen & Olsen; and defendant State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, by and through counsel 
of record, Darwin C. Hansen, Esq., stipulate that plaintiff's 
Complaint against defendants Terry Raymond Grow, as personal 
Stuart H. Schultz, #2886 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Terry Raymond Grow 
and Pat Grow 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
STIPULATION, MOTION AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Civil No. C87-1789 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
x*. > y V - *^ x. «-> w , U u c e - J i i c i J , 4^ j i u x-^»t_ c .L «„> w 
(hereinafter Grow), and all claims contained therein and arising 
therefrom, have been settled, compromised, and resolved in full, 
and that said Complaint and all such claims against Grow may be 
dismissed, with prejudice, on the merits, with plaintiff and defendants 
Grow to bear their respective costs and fees. 
The parties, through respective counsel, further stipulate 
that plaintiff's Complaint and claims against State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company for no-fault insurance benefits, 
costs, and attorney's fees arising from the no-fault insurance 
statutory provisions of the State of Utah are hereby reserved, 
and that all of the defenses of State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company are also hereby reserved and all such claims 
and defenses remain pending in this litigation. 
Except as herein above specifically reserved and set forth, 
all other claims of plaintiff against all defendants may be dismissed, 
with prejudice, with the parties to bear their respective costs 
and fees. 
The parties, through respective counsel, move the court for 
an Order pursuant to this stipulation. 
DATED this ' Y^L day of March, 1988. 
JABMNE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
>er 
^Attorneys for Plaintiff 
^ 
DATED this <^/ day of March, 1988. 
STRONG & HANNI 
^A*J4J 
Stuart H. Schultfz, 
Attorneys for Mr. arid Mrs. Grow 
-?-
DATED this / '•'' day of March, 1988. 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
By // ^f-^i--
**ll 
Nolan J. Oisen 
Co-Counsel^for Mr. and Mrs. Grow 
DATED this \J / day of March, 19 
C. Hansen /t / 
attorney for State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company 
ORDER 
Pursuant to the stipulation and motion of the parties, through 
respective counsel, and good cause appearing, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintifffs Complaint and all claims contained therein 
and arising therefrom against defendants Grow have been settled, 
compromised, and resolved in full, and said Complaint and all such 
claims are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, on the merits, with 
the parties to bear their respective costs and fees; 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint against defendant State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company for no-fault insurance benefits, 
costs, and attorney's fees related to such claims for no-fault 
insurance benefits arising out of the no-fault statute of the 
State of Utah, and all of defendant State Farm's defenses to such 
claims are reserved and remain pending in this litigation; and 
3. Except as specifically reserved in paragraph 2 of this 
Order, all other parts of plaintiff's Complaint and all claims 
contained therein and arising therefrom against all defendants 
-3-
are hereby dismissed, witn prejudice, on the merits, with the 
parties to bear their respective costs and fees. 
DATED this ^ / day o£/s/&t^^</l_ 1988. 
BY-^THS^COURT ^ 
ames- S. Sawaya S 
i J i s tx ic t Judge' ' ATTF.H7 
H. DJXGN h*r < -7Y 
^ X . •^rs^ 
Deputy Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT were mailed by United States mail, 
postage prepaid, on this >c_,/ AJ{f\ day of December, 1988, 
to: \ 
James R. Brown 
Harold L. Reiser 
JARDINE# LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
